Research summary · Checked 31 October 2026
UK legal supplier readiness for post-quantum encryption — October 2026
Encrypted traffic recorded today could be decrypted once quantum computers break today's public-key encryption. This is the "harvest now, decrypt later" risk. Wills, trusts and deal files must stay confidential for decades, so what matters is whether the suppliers carrying that data already protect it in transit. We connected to each supplier's public login servers the way a browser does and recorded what they negotiated.
5 of 17
suppliers already use hybrid post-quantum key exchange on the servers we tested
3 of 17
still accept only TLS 1.2, which cannot carry post-quantum key exchange at all
9 of 17
have published no post-quantum product roadmap we could find
What we observed
| Supplier | Used by firms for | In transit today | Published position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Google Workspace | Email, documents | Hybrid PQ | 2029 migration target |
| NetDocuments | Document management | Hybrid PQ | Claims post-quantum document encryption (at rest not verified) |
| Zoom | Client meetings | Hybrid PQ | Post-quantum end-to-end encryption available, not on by default |
| Cloudflare | Website, edge | Hybrid PQ | On by default for all plans |
| AWS (KMS, London) | Hosting, key management | Hybrid PQ | Supported; varies by service |
| Microsoft 365 | Email, Teams, SharePoint | Classical TLS 1.3 | Critical services to move by 2029 |
| DocuSign | E-signature | Classical TLS 1.3 | Moving signatures to ML-DSA |
| Adobe Acrobat Sign | E-signature | Classical TLS 1.3 | No post-quantum PDF signatures yet |
| iManage Cloud | Document management | Classical TLS 1.3 | No public statement found |
| Clio · LEAP · Intapp | Practice management | Classical TLS 1.3 | No public statement found |
| Dropbox | File sharing | Classical TLS 1.3 | No public statement found |
| Barracuda | Backup, email security | Classical TLS 1.3 | General guidance only, no product roadmap |
| Mimecast | Email security | TLS 1.2 only | No public statement found |
| Egress | Encrypted email | TLS 1.2 only | No public statement found |
| ShareFile | Client file portal | TLS 1.2 only | No public statement found |
What this means for a law firm
- The tools built for confidential material are furthest behind. Secure-email and client-portal services are where privileged documents travel.
- Supplier upgrades protect the future, not the past. Traffic recorded before a supplier upgrades stays exposed.
- Stored files are not the weak point. AES-256 at rest holds up. The risk sits in the key exchange while data moves, and in signatures.
- Deleting what you no longer need is the cheapest control. Data a firm doesn't hold can't be decrypted later.
Three questions to ask each supplier
- When will the services carrying our client data support TLS 1.3 with hybrid post-quantum key exchange (ML-KEM)?
- Do you have a published post-quantum roadmap with dates, aligned with NCSC's 2028 / 2031 / 2035 targets?
- How will signed documents and certificates move to post-quantum signatures, and how will long-term validity be kept?
Method and limits
On 31 Oct 2026 we made a standard TLS connection from the UK to public login or web servers for each supplier, offering hybrid post-quantum groups first, and recorded the TLS version and key exchange negotiated. We tested public endpoints only, not each firm's own tenant, not mail-server-to-mail-server delivery, and not data at rest. A single server does not represent every product a supplier runs. "Published position" summarises public statements available on that date. This is not an assurance or endorsement, and no supplier is described as "quantum-safe". NCSC dates are targets, not deadlines.